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A Dual-Process Model of Economic Rationality: The Symmetric Effect of Hot and Cold 
Evaluations on Economic Decision Making 
 
We explore the budget waste coming from inconsistent choices triggered by  “hot” and “cold” 
evaluations, as well as the overall budget waste across both types of evaluations. We find that 
budget waste coming from “hot” and “cold” evaluations is comparable, but the overall waste of 
budget across the two types of evaluations is significantly higher.  
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Consumers often go grocery shopping to buy food to consume throughout the week. One of 
their basic goals is to choose products that maximize their utility given the available budget. 
However, very often individuals make suboptimal decisions, which can potentially result in a 
loss of utility (Kahneman 2003; Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Understanding what drives 
economic rationality of consumers’ decisions is essential in order to help them improve the 
quality of their decisions, and as a result prevent significant losses of utility and enhance welfare 
(Ratner et al. 2008). The aim of the present research is to obtain more insight in the economic 
rationality of consumers’ decisions. 
A lot of research has linked irrationality to behavior triggered by a dual-processing system 
(Dhar and Gorlin, 2012). According to the literature, human behavior is guided by two types of 
processes (Kahneman and Frederick 2002), often referred to as a hot system and a cool system. 
The hot system operates relatively automatically, quickly and effortlessly, whereas the cool 
system is more deliberate, slow and effortful. The aim of the present research is to explore 
economic rationality in consumers’ choice behavior based on the two different systems, using a 
direct measure of economic rationality. Relying on the theory of Revealed Preferences, we 
develop a task that allows us to investigate rationality of behaviors based on the hot system on 
the one hand and the cold system on the other hand, and also allows us to investigate the overall 
rationality across the two systems. We do this by capturing the loss of budget resulting from 
those choice behaviors.  
 
Dual System Theory and Rationality 
 
One of the important assumptions in behavioral science is that decision making is driven by 
two types of processes (Epstein 1994; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Kahneman and Frederick 
2002; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2004), often referred to as the hot and the cool system. The 
hot system is quick and heuristic-based, whereas the cool system is deliberate and rule-based. 
The main features of the hot system are its automatic operation and minimal demands on 
working memory. The hot system operates mostly through components of associative memory, 
meaning that different associations emerge spontaneously and influence behavior. The hot 
system tends to be rapid, unconscious and uncontrollable (Evans and Stanovich 2013). In 
contrast, the main features of the cool system are its active engagement of working memory and 
analytical thinking. Cool system processing happens willful, and is effortful most of the time. It 
tends to be slow, conscious and controllable (Evans and Stanovich 2013).  
In an experimental study, Shiv et al. (2005) showed that participants able to use their 
emotional (hot) system made less advantageous gambling decisions and thus gained less money 
than participants not able to use their emotional system (due to brain damage) and thus relying on 
their cool system only for making decisions. Consumer research also provided evidence on the 
lack of rationality in choices resulting from hot system activation. Pocheptsova et al. (2009) 
found that consumers relying on their hot system (due to resource depletion) engaged in 
behaviors that are typically viewed as not rational, such as an increase in reference-dependent 
choices and the attraction effect. Moreover, studies on resource depletion showed that depleted 
consumers using their hot system were willing to pay significantly higher amounts of money for 
products than consumers who were not previously depleted (e.g. Bruyneel et al. 2006). 
On the other hand, more recent studies showed that certain features of cool state behavior 
can potentially lead to decisions being considered as irrational. Relying on cognitive processing 
during a choice task has been found to lead to less preference consistency than relying on 
affective processing (Lee et al. 2009; Nordgren and Dijksterhuis 2009).  These studies argue that 
deliberation can hinder systematic processing in decisions as it operates as a form of distraction 
which pulls individuals’ attention away from the most relevant information. Similarly, studies on 
unconscious thought and decision making show that the more deliberative approach taken by the 
cool system can lead to less accurate decisions in some situations (Dijksterhuis 2004; 
Dijksterhuis et al. 2006).  
Adopting yet another perspective, some studies suggest that loss of utility does not result 
from activation of a specific (i.e., the hot or the cool) system, but rather from a potential  
discrepancy between decision frames and/or decision situations. For instance, Read and 
Loewenstein (1995) found that when people choose multiple goods simultaneously (for instance 
during grocery shopping), they choose more variety of products than when they choose these 
goods sequentially (i.e., known as the “diversification bias”). According to the authors, this 
discrepancy in desired variety can potentially lead to inconsistent choices and loss of utility over 
time. Investigating the diversification bias further, Read et al. (1999) concluded that what 
appears to be desirable locally might not be likeable when adopting a more global perspective.  
To summarize, findings on the influence of dual-processing on rationality are equivocal. 
There are studies implying that economic irrationality is driven by the hot system, but there are 
also studies hinting at the idea that the cool system triggers irrational behavior. Other studies 
adopt a more neutral position, and suggest that a discrepancy between decision situations (and 
decision frames or states) may trigger inconsistent decisions, and thus result in an overall loss of 
utility. However, none of the studies investigating irrationality in decisions has used a direct 
measure of economic rationality involving conditions with different price regimes and budget 
restrictions. We believe that an investigation that does this could be very helpful in shedding 
light on the drivers of economic (ir)rationality. We use the General Axiom of Revealed 
Preferences (GARP) and Afriat’s Index to examine rational choice behavior in terms of efficient 
budget use. This method also enables us to experimentally isolate and assess the rationalities in 
hot states and cool states independently (local rationalities), as well as assess the overall 
rationality across the two states (global rationality) and compare to the local rationalities. 
 
Revealed preferences and Afriat’s Index 
 
Varian (1982) formulated the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP), which 
makes use of indirect revealed preferences. A chosen bundle of goods xi is “indirectly revealed 
preferred” over  some other bundle xt, if and only if  there exists a sequence of bundles xj, xk ,… , 
xs such that xi is directly preferred over xj, xj is directly preferred over xk, … , and xs is directly 
preferred over xt. According to the GARP, if a bundle xi is indirectly revealed preferred to xt, 
then xt is not strictly directly revealed preferred to xi, that is, xi is not strictly within the budget 
set when xt is chosen. Varian proved that GARP is a sufficient and necessary condition for 
decision-makers’ choices to be consistent with the maximization of a concave, weakly 
monotonic, locally non-satiated and continuous utility function.  
Figure 1 exhibits a GARP violation. Suppose an individual wants to dedicate a budget of 
120$ between 2 products X and Y. When the prices are p1 (X=12, Y=8) the individual can buy 
all combinations below the budget line b1. Suppose the individual chooses to buy the 
combination A(X=8, Y=3). When the prices change to p2 (X=8,Y=12) all possible combinations 
that lie in the area below the budget line b2 can be bought. However, should the individual 
choose to buy the combination B(X=3, Y=8), this would violate the GARP: bundle A is revealed 
preferred to bundle B, and bundle B is strictly revealed preferred to bundle A. By choosing 
combination B the individual actually wastes money as, for the given prices p2, the revealed 
preferred bundle A was available at a lower cost (equal to 8*8+3*12=100$) than the chosen 
bundle B (in which case s/he pays 3*8+8*12=120$). In our example the individual thus failed to 
maximize the utility of the given budget as s/he chose bundle A over B when B was cheaper, 
while s/he also chose bundle B over A when bundle A was cheaper. Below we will introduce 
Afriat’s Index as a measure for the efficiency of consumers’ choices, which captures exactly this 





The essence of Revealed Preference theory and GARP lies in the concept of indifference 
curves. Indifference curves show the different bundles of goods between which a decision maker 
is indifferent. In other words, indifference curves show the quantity of product X an individual is 
willing to sacrifice to get a certain quantity of product Y. A utility maximizing individual always 
wants to move to higher indifference curves as s/he gets better bundles of products, meaning that 
s/he can combine the same quantity of X with larger quantities of Y and vice versa. An 
individual who (given the chance) fails to move to higher indifference curves is considered to be 
irrational.  In the case of the example, a rational choice that maximizes the utility of the available 
budget at prices p2, given the fact that the individual chose the combination A (X=8, Y=3) at 
prices p1, would be combinations placed on the dotted section of the budget line b2, for example 
the combination D (X=12, Y=2). Choosing these combinations would allow the individual to 
move to higher indifferences curves and end up with bundles containing larger quantities of 







Afriat (1973) has introduced an efficiency index which can be used to measure the severity 
of the GARP violations. This measure has been developed in the context of budget waste. As 
explained above, a violation of GARP can be interpreted as a waste of money. The index can 
take values between 0 and 1. A value of 1 means that there are no GARP violations (and no 
budget is wasted), whereas a value below 1 reveals that GARP is violated (with corresponding 
budget waste). Generally, lower index values indicate that a larger fraction of the budget is 
wasted. We use GARP and Afriat’s index to assess the local rationality of choice behaviors based 





Participants were 139 students from a large university (43.9% women, average age 20.43 
years, SD=2.01). They were invited to come to the lab to complete a task gauging economic 
rationality in exchange for money or course credit. To be able to calculate Afriat’s Index we 
created a choice task to assess participants’ revealed preferences (table 1). Our task was similar 
to the one used in studies of Harbaugh et al. (2001) and Bruyneel et al. (2012). It included 12 
sequential choice problems, with each choice problem consisting of four products: two vice, 
relative tasty but not so healthy (chocolate bar and Dorito chips) products, and two virtue, 
relative healthy but not so tasty (baby carrots and raisins) products. The prices of the products 
differed for every choice problem. Participants were asked to indicate the quantities they wanted 
from each product given the different price regimes and their budget (10 tokens). For every 
choice problem participants had to spend their entire budget and had the option to choose non-
integer quantities.  
We used a mixed design consisting of three between-subjects conditions: An experimental 
condition in which the hot and cool systems were sequentially activated during two choice-
making episodes, and two control conditions in which only one of the two systems was activated 
(cool or hot). As a manipulation of hot and cool system activation we varied the visceral state 
hunger. Similar to the design of Nordgren et al. (2007), in the hungry state participants were 
instructed to not eat for at least four hours prior to the study. In the satiated state, participants 
were instructed to eat a full meal within an hour prior to the study. In the experimental condition, 
participants completed the choice task once hungry (hot) and once satiated (cool). The order of 
the tasks was counterbalanced and separated by one week. In the cool control condition 
participants were asked to come to the lab satiated (eat a full meal within an hour prior to the 
study) both times, whereas in the hot control condition participants were asked to come to the lab 
hungry both times. The purpose of the control conditions was to increase confidence that 
potential differences in rationality between states in the experimental condition could be 
attributed to differences between the two systems, rather than to noise driven by the one week 
time lag between experimental sessions.  
For every condition, we measured the relative virtue and vice consumption in each state, as 
well as the Afriat’s Index for each state (system) separately, and the aggregated Afriat’s Index 
across both states (systems). 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
To check the hunger manipulation, we ran two repeated measures ANOVAs, one for vice 
consumption and one for virtue consumption, with condition as between-subjects variable 
(experimental, cool control and hot control) and with session/state as within-subjects variable. 
We found no main effects for condition, but we found the expected interaction between 
session/state and condition for vice as well as virtue consumption (table 1). A paired samples test 
showed that in the experimental condition respondents chose more grams of vice products when 
hungry (Mhungry=211.99, SD=72,81)  than when satiated (Msatiated=177,87, SD=82.20; t(66)=3.90, 
p<0.001), whereas they chose fewer grams of virtue products when hungry (Mhungry=119.87, 
SD=70.38) than when satiated (Msatiated=149,52, SD=79,20; t(66)=3.49, p=0.001). In the control 
conditions none of these differences were significant (table 1).  
A Wilcoxon signed rank test on the Afriat’s indices of the two states in the experimental 
condition showed that the difference in the rationalities was insignificant (Mhungry=0.972, 
SD=0.081, Msatiated=0.966, SD=0.054, Z=-0.826, p=0.409). The results indicate that respondents’ 
choices were equally (ir)rational in both decision frames. The means of the Afriat’s indices 
indicate that individuals wasted on average approximately 3% of their budget due to suboptimal 
choices. We also calculated overall rationality across the two states in the experimental condition 
in a way that allowed us to directly compare it with the individual rationalities for the two states 
separately. To meaningfully compare the three indices we constructed an overall Afriat’s index 
with components that were identical to the ones of the individual indices. Specifically, we 
randomly picked six observations from each time frame dataset for each respondent to neutralize 
the fact that Afriat’s index is sensitive to the number of observations. We avoided picking the 
same price regime twice to ensure that the price regime variation in the global rationality 
assessment was identical with that of the within-frame tests. This yielded a dataset consisting of 
12 observations per individual that allowed us to calculate an overall, cross-frames Afriat’s index 
that was directly comparable to the local indices. We repeated the same procedure 200 times and 
calculated the average of the overall Afriat’s index for every respondent. The overall rationality 
was significantly lower (Moverall=0.93, SD=0.077) than the rationality of the individual states 
(Z=-3.836, p<0.001 for the hungry state, Z=-3.169, p=0.002 for the satiated state). The use of 
budget inconsistent with GARP was 2.8% for the hungry state and 3.3% for the satiated state, 
whereas overall it was 7%.  
We repeated the same procedure to study differences between the three indices in the cool and 
hot control conditions, respectively, and found that these differences were all insignificant (table 
1). Taken together, the findings of our first experiment suggest that choices of individuals in hot 
and cool decision states are equally rational. However, the overall rationally across the different 
states is lower. Thus, though choice behaviors relying on different systems seem equally rational 
at a local level, conflicting preferences revealed by these systems can have a negative impact on 
rationality at a more global level. Ours findings show that the difference in preferences resulting 




Participants were 118 students from a large university (60% women, average age 21.18 
years, SD=3.62). They were invited to come to the lab to complete a task assessing economic 
rationality (see Study 1) in exchange for money or course credit. We again made use of a mixed 
design including three between-subjects conditions, completed in two sessions (48 hours 
difference). Specifically, in the experimental condition a different system was activated in every 
session, whereas in the two control conditions the same system was activated (either cool or hot) 
in every session. A cognitive load task was used as a manipulation of the hot versus cool system. 
That is, participants were asked to keep in mind  a difficult sequence of 8 different consonants 
(e.g. GTPWLZKN) or an easy sequence of 8 identical consonants (BBBBBBBB), respectively 
(Kruger 1999). Cognitive load prevents individuals from deliberating and makes them use their 
hot system more (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999). In the experimental condition, participants 
executed the decision task while keeping in mind the difficult sequence in one of the two 
sessions, and while keeping in mind the easy sequence in the other session. In the cool control 
condition participants were asked to keep in mind the easy sequence while making their 
decisions in both of the sessions, whereas in the hot control condition participants had to keep in 
mind the difficult sequence while making decisions in both of the sessions. To motivate 
participants to make utility-maximizing choices, we raised the budget to 20 tokens and told 




We again ran two repeated measures Anovas, one for vice consumption and one for virtue 
consumption, with condition as between-subjects variable (experimental condition, control cool, 
and control hot) and with session/state as within-subjects variable to check the state 
manipulation. We found no main effects for condition, but neither did we find the expected 
interaction between session/state and condition for vice as well as virtue consumption (table 1). 
The pattern of results however confirms our expectations. A paired samples test showed that 
respondents in the experimental condition chose more grams of vice products when under 
cognitive load (Mload=390.72, SD=151.07) than when not under load (Mnonload=363.34 
(SD=168.36); t(62)=-2.645, p<0.010), whereas they chose fewer grams of virtue products when 
under load (Mload=257.64, SD=144.74) than when not (Mnonload=278.57, SD=160.65; t(62)= 
2.097, p=0.040). None of the differences in the control conditions was significant (see table1).  
For the experimental condition, the difference in Afriat’s index between the two states 
(Mload=0.937, SD=0.108, Mnonload=0.941, SD=0.106) was again insignificant (Z=-0.077, 
p=0.939). After a similar processing of the data as in Study 1, we calculated overall rationality 
and compared it with the separate rationality indices. The overall rationality was significantly 
lower (Moverall=0.913, SD=0.112) than the rationality of the individual states (Z=--2.144, p<0.032 
for load condition, Z=-2.362, p=0.018 for non-load condition). Again none of the differences 
between any of the indices in the control conditions was significant (see table 1).  
The findings indicate, in line with study 1, that locally, rationality of choice behaviors 
relying on the hot or cool system is high and not significantly different between systems. 
However, once more we noticed a significant decrease in rationality when calculated across 
behaviors resulting from both systems. These results confirm that a significant loss of utility is 





We conducted two studies to assess rationality of choice behaviors relying on a hot and 
cool decision system. Results of the two studies indicate that the choice behavior resulting from 
both systems is equally rational, despite the fact that the product preferences were different. We 
conclude that both systems are equally appropriate to make economic decisions. However, a 
further analysis revealed that the discrepancy between the choices under the influence of the two 
systems had a negative impact on the overall rationality of the choices. This drop in overall 
rationality shows that the discrepancy between the preferences revealed by the different decision 
systems is responsible for a significant loss of decision utility.  
Our findings provide an answer to the question as to which system leads to more 
economically rational choices. We show that when it comes to economic decisions, both systems 
can be equally rational. Our study is the first to include realistic economic conditions, such as 
budget constraints and price variance, which presumably contributes to the discrepancy between 
previous findings and ours. The symmetry in our findings suggests that the decision making rules 
followed by the two systems in economic contexts involving price regimes and budget 
constraints might not be all that different. This is consistent with recent proposals suggesting that 
deliberative and intuitive judgment, as based on the cool and the hot system respectively, can be 
based on common principles in certain environments (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011).  
We contribute to the literature on economic rationality by showing that loss of utility due to 
irrational choices is not a result of the decisions driven by one specific system directly, but of the 
conflicting choices driven by these two systems separately instead. Our findings suggest that, 
although the levels of rationality resulting from activation of the two systems is not different, the 
discrepancy between choices resulting from activation of both systems can lead to suboptimal 
choices and loss of utility from an overall perspective. Last, our findings show that dual-system 
processing prevents consumers from forming global judgments about trade-offs between various 
products, and as a result prevents them from reaching indifference levels that would allow them 
to make the most optimal decisions. This finding can be related to literature on affective 
forecasting errors and hot-cold (and vice versa) empathy gaps (e.g. Fisher and Rangel 2014), as it 
is in line with the idea that difficulty of  one system to appropriately “forecast” the preferences 
activated by the other system leads to a waste of budget.  
 
  




Repeated Measures Anova 
 Vice Virtue 
Condition F=0.673 p=0.512 F=0.570 p=0.567 





 Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(66) P Virtue t(66) p  
Hungry 211.99 (SD=72.81)   119.87 (SD=70.38)    
Satiated 177,87 (SD=82,20) 3.90 <0.001 149.52 (SD=79.20) 3.49 0.001  
 
Rationalities 
Sessions Afriat’s Index Differences 
  Hungry-Satiated Hungry-Overall Satiated-Overall 
  Z P Z p Z p 
Hungry 0.972 (SD=0.081)       
Satiated 0.966 (SD=0.054) -0.261 0.794     
Overall 0.93 (SD=0.077)   -3.836 <0.001 -3.169 0.002 
 
Control Condition (satiated-satiated) 
 
Product Choices 
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(30) p Virtue t(30) p  
Session 1 186.89 (SD=92.57)   132.55 (SD=92.88)    
Session2 184.14 (SD=85.38) 0.575 0.569 135.58 (SD=82.52) -0.554 0.584  
 
Rationalities 
Sessions Afriat’s Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.954 (SD=0.091)       
Session 2 0.950 (SD=0.119) -0.568 0.570     
Overall 0.944 (SD=0.106)   -0.597 0.550 -1.232 0.218 
 
Control Condition (Hungry-Hungry) 
 
Product Choices 
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(40) p Virtue t(40) p  
Session 1 177.14 (SD=80.48)   149.25(SD=73.38)    
Session 2 177.59 (SD=84.26) -0.083 0.934 149.17 (SD=78.85) 0.15 0.988  
 
Rationalities 
Sessions Afriat’s Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z P Z p 
Session1 0.960 (SD=0.077)       
Session2 0.956 (SD=0.087) -0.261 0.794     




Repeated Measures Anova 
 Vice Virtue 
Condition F=1.094 p=0.338 F=0.961 p=0.385 




Product Choices  
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(63) p Virtue t(63) p  
Cognitive load 390.72 (SD=151.07)   257.64 (SD=144.74)    
Non-load 363.34 (SD=168.36) -2.645 0.010 278.57(SD=160.65) 2.097 0.040  
 
Rationalities 
Sessions Afriat’s Index Differences 
  Cognitive load-Non-load Cognitive load-Overall Non-load-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Cognitive load 0.937 (SD=0.108)       
Non-load 0.941 (SD=0.106) -0.077 0.939     
Overall 0.913 (SD=0.112)   -2.144 0.032 -2.362 0.018 
 
Control Condition (Non-load – Non-load) 
 
Product Choices 
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference    
 Vice t(25) p Virtue t(25) p  
Session 1 333.37 (SD=146.85)   308.86 (SD=141.34)    
Session 2 338.93 (SD=148.25) -0.365 0.718 304.10 (SD=139.40) 0.329 0.745  
 
Rationalities 
Session 1 Afriat’s Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.943 (SD=0.093)       
Session 2 0.934 (SD=0.123) -0.063 0.950     
Overall 0.931 (SD=0.100)   -0.795 0.427 -0.511 0.609 
 
Control Condition (Cognitive load – Cognitive Load) 
 
Product Choices 
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(27) p Virtue t(27) p  
Session 1 394.28 (SD=119.50)   255.51 (SD=121.26)    
Session 2 388.26 (SD=128.29) -0.336 0.740 260.43 (SD=125.29) 0.417 0.680  
 
Rationalities 
States Afriat’s Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.946 (SD=0.110)       
Session 2 0.945 (SD=0.113) -0.051 0.959     
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